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Common-Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason 
 
Adrian Vermeule
*
 
Common-law constitutionalism is a theory, or rather a family of theories, about 
constitutional adjudication.  The family includes the idea that courts do and should 
develop the meaning of general or ambiguous constitutional texts by reference to 
tradition and precedent, rather than original understanding, and the related idea that 
courts do and should proceed in a Burkean rather than ambitiously rationalist or 
innovative fashion.  In recent years, the central and most striking claim of common-law 
constitutionalism has been that precedent and tradition embody some form of latent 
wisdom.  Judges will generally do best by deferring to the wisdom embodied in precedent 
and tradition, rather than trusting to their unaided reason, or so the general claim runs. 
In what follows, I offer a critical analysis of the mechanisms that are said to 
generate this latent wisdom.  Drawing throughout on Jeremy Bentham’s critique of the 
subconstitutional common law, I attempt to update Bentham by using the tools of modern 
social science and by adapting his claims to the setting of constitutional law.  My 
conclusions, however, remain largely Benthamite in spirit: the constitutional common 
law is not plausibly seen as a repository of latent wisdom.  The relevant claims and 
mechanisms suffer from infirmities of internal logic and from a failure to make 
institutional comparisons between and among precedent and tradition, on the one hand, 
and the outputs of legislatures, executive officials, and constitutional framers on the 
other.   
The idea most frequently invoked to connect common-law constitutionalism and 
the limits of reason is 
Burke’s Dictum: “We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own 
private stock of reason, because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, 
and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank 
and capital of nations, and of ages.  Many of our men of speculation, instead of 
exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom 
which prevails in them.”
1
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1 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 183 (W. Alison Phillips & Catherine 
Beatrice Phillips eds., 1912) (1970).   
  Limits of Reason 
Burke's dictum is a claim about ordinary common law, not constitutional common law; 
Burke celebrated a common-law system that did not include judicial review.
2  B u t  
common-law constitutionalists, invoking Burkean themes, have transposed these 
mechanisms to the setting of constitutional adjudication, emphasizing the immanent 
rationality and evolutionary or adaptive fitness of constitutional precedents and traditions.  
As we shall see, these ideas can be interpreted either in informational terms, through the 
lens of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, or in evolutionary terms, by reference to models in 
which common-law processes evolve towards efficiency.   
In either case, however, I will suggest a range of puzzles and problems that limit 
the mechanisms’ operation to a narrow set of conditions and sharply limit their relevance 
to constitutional law and theory.  The rash of scholarship that portrayed Arrow’s 
Theorem as a revolutionary contribution to legal theory (albeit not intended as such) has 
abated, in part because it has become apparent that the Theorem’s conditions are highly 
restrictive.
3  I suggest that the same skepticism is warranted here.  Common-law 
constitutionalism may or may not be justifiable or superior to its competitors on other 
grounds, but the informational and evolutionary mechanisms recently invoked to depict it 
as a repository of latent wisdom turn out to be intrinsically fragile and institutionally 
ungrounded.    
The central theme in the following critique is this: arguments for the rationality or 
efficiency of the ordinary common law, or of societal traditions, do not translate 
successfully into arguments for the rationality or efficiency of the constitutional common 
law, especially as compared to statutes and other sources of law.  The institutional 
context of constitutional adjudication is decisively different than that of ordinary 
common-law adjudication.  Both the epistemic and evolutionary mechanisms at most 
suggest that a single judge can do better by deferring to the collective wisdom embodied 
in the decisions of past judges, or in larger societal traditions, rather than by relying on 
her unaided reason.  Perhaps this is sometimes the situation faced by judges in the 
shrinking domain of ordinary common-law cases, where there is no statute or 
administrative regulation in the picture.  Yet this is almost never the situation that judges 
face in constitutional adjudication.  The alternative to relying on precedent or tradition, in 
constitutional law, is never reliance on the unaided reason of the single judge; the 
alternative is reliance on the latent wisdom of collective legislatures, or of the executive 
branch, or of a group of constitutional framers.  In different contexts, each of these 
sources has distinctive costs and benefits.  However, the relevant institutional 
comparisons are much different than, and more complex than, the simple comparison of 
unaided reason to collective wisdom emphasized by Burke. 
The discussion is structured as follows.  Part I discusses Burke as Condorcet – the 
idea that Burke’s dictum can be interpreted epistemically, in light of the information-
aggregating models developed under the umbrella of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.  I 
suggest that the Jury Theorem has no clear payoff for constitutional adjudication.  The 
Theorem’s rather stringent conditions will frequently be violated by the precedents or 
                                                 
2 At least not in anything like its current form.  See Phillip A. Hamburger, Revolution and Judicial Review: 
Chief Justice Holt's Opinion in City of London v. Wood, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2091 (1994).
3 See GERRY MACKIE, DEMOCRACY DEFENDED (2004); see also Don Herzog, Dragonslaying, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 757 (2005); see also Saul Levmore, Public Choice Defended, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 777 (2005). 
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societal traditions that common-law constitutionalists would draw upon.  Most 
importantly, justifying common-law constitutionalism on the basis of the Jury Theorem is 
fatally noncomparative.  Statutes, administrative decisions, and constitutional texts also 
embody information and are also the product of many minds.  In a range of cases, those 
sources will often be superior to precedents and societal traditions, according to the Jury 
Theorem’s own criteria and logic.  Indeed, the epistemic interpretation of Burke leads 
most directly to James Bradley Thayer – to deference to legislatures in constitutional 
adjudication. 
Part II discusses Burke as Darwin – the idea that Burke’s dictum can be 
interpreted in light of evolutionary models in which the common law converges to 
efficiency.  I suggest that these models, like the Jury Theorem, have no obvious payoff 
for constitutional adjudication.  Even if efficiency or adaptive fitness is a desirable 
property of the ordinary common law, it is a problematic normative goal for 
constitutional law.  In any event, the mechanisms of common-law evolution have no clear 
counterpart in constitutional law.  The central evolutionary mechanism in common-law 
theory – that the selection effects of litigation cause inefficient rules to be weeded out 
over time – is of dubious relevance to constitutional law, where litigation is infrequent 
and stakes are chronically distributed in an unequal way across organized and 
unorganized interests.  Most important is that even if the constitutional common law is 
constantly converging to efficiency, the background environment is changing as well, 
which means that constitutional precedent may or may not be efficient at any given time.  
If the political environment changes with sufficient rapidity, constitutional common law 
will face a moving target, and will not have enough time to converge to or even close to 
efficiency.   
For that reason lawmaking through alternative procedures, such as legislation, 
will often prove at least as efficient as precedent.  Even if constitutional law is constantly 
converging towards the optimum, legislation may be closer to the optimum at any given 
point in time, given a changing environment.  Here too, the crucial institutional 
comparison is between legislative constitutionalism and common-law constitutionalism.  
There is no general reason to think that the evolutionary capacity of common-law 
constitutionalism is systematically superior to that of legislative constitutionalism.  Even 
if the efficiency thesis is useful in the ordinary subconstitutional context of common-law 
adjudication, its utility is obscure in the very different setting of constitutional law.   
Throughout, I pursue a two-fold strategy, both identifying internal problems with 
the optimistic accounts of the common law that I canvass, and then proceeding to 
examine whether those accounts, even if correct, can be transposed to the institutional 
setting of constitutional adjudication.  In each case, the internal critique is a necessary 
preliminary to the constitutional discussion; the mechanisms of common-law 
constitutionalism that I discuss cannot be understood in the abstract, without reference to 
the common-law context from which they arose.  However, I take no position on whether 
these mechanisms offer successful accounts of the ordinary common law.  My central 
claim is that even if they do, no transposition to the constitutional setting is possible. 
All in all, the idea that common-law constitutionalism is a repository of latent 
wisdom, and enables judges to cope with the limits of human reason, finds little support 
in informational or evolutionary mechanisms.  This does not touch arguments that justify 
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common-law constitutionalism on other grounds,
4 nor does it speak to other debates over 
constitutional adjudication.  It does, however, remove a main strut of recent arguments 
for common-law constitutionalism. 
I.  Burke as Condorcet 
  Section A details a Condorcetian interpretation of Burke’s dictum as a mechanism 
for aggregating information: the decisions of a line of past judges embody aggregated 
information that is superior to the unaided reason of any single judge or small group of 
judges sitting today.  Section B analyzes a series of problems arising from the internal 
logic of this interpretation, suggesting that Condorcet Jury Theorem’s conditions are too 
restrictive for the interpretation to be convincing.  Section C turns to comparative 
institutional problems.  The idea that decisions of a line of past judges are better than the 
decisions of a single judge today has only obscure relevance for constitutional 
adjudication.  There the question is not whether judges should be guided by their unaided 
reason; it is whether they should defer to past judges rather than the views of 
constitutional framers or current legislative and executive institutions.  In that 
comparison, the Condorcetian logic suggests that in many cases, precedent is not the best 
source of information. 
A.  Burke, Condorcet and Second-Order Rationality 
  Common-law constitutionalism represents an explicitly Burkean strain in 
constitutional theory.
5  The basic commitment of Burkean theorists is to tradition, 
somehow understood.  For some, tradition has intrinsic worth, and adherence to tradition 
is intrinsically admirable or at least inevitable.  On this view, tradition is constitutive of 
our very identities.
6  To break with tradition threatens a kind of cultural suicide, and in 
any event is necessarily ineffective, because tradition will continue to shape the very 
attempt to break with it.   
For other Burkeans, however, tradition has instrumental or derivative value.   
Tradition can be and has been defended on a variety of instrumental grounds, including 
the value of small-scale incremental change as opposed to sudden large-scale change, and 
                                                 
4 For example, on the basis of the value of stability and protecting settled expectations.  For an overview of 
arguments, see Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After All?, 21 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (1997).  
5 See Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 509 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional 
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996);Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean 
Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C.L. Rev. 619 (1994).  Common-law 
constitutionalism is also compatible with Friedrich Hayek’s claim that the common law, analogously to 
markets, embodies dispersed or decentralized information that is superior in the aggregate to the 
information of any of its participants.  See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, 
VOLUME 1: RULES AND ORDER (1978).  That claim fits naturally with a Condorcetian interpretation: as I 
will explain shortly, the Jury Theorem relies on dispersed information for its aggregative effects, and 
describes conditions under which the information held by the voting or statistical group will be superior to 
that held by any of the group’s members.  However, beyond these general points, there is little difference 
between the Burkean and Hayekian strains to any of the claims relevant here, and in constitutional theory 
the self-conception of the central theorists is Burkean, not Hayekian.  Accordingly, I focus on Burke’s 
dictum rather than its Hayekian relatives.      
6 ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1995). 
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the related idea that institutions evolving incrementally over time are more likely to be 
optimal than designed institutions.  I examine such claims in Part II.  This Part addresses 
the epistemic argument for tradition: the argument that following traditions is the best 
response to the limits of human rationality, cognitive capacity, and information.  In one 
sense, this is a limited inquiry, but the epistemic argument for Burkeanism is enduring 
and central; it unites many disparate strands of Burkeanism in a common distaste for 
“theorizing,” “unaided reason,” “rationalism” and “innovation.” 
In particular, I focus on the epistemic justification for Burkean adjudication.   
Here, by a kind of mental commitment, the Burkean judge suspends his or her own first-
order reason about the merits of individual policies, in order to follow a simpler second-
order rule of thumb: policies that comport with tradition, somehow defined, are 
permissible; policies that do not are not permissible, or at least suspect.  The argument for 
this decision procedure is that over an array of future cases, the Burkean judge believes 
she will do better by following tradition than by following her unaided reason.  The 
Burkean approach is thus a kind of second-order rationalism that distrusts first-order 
rationalism, in which judges deciding particular cases attempt, on a blank slate, to figure 
out for themselves what is best.   
The shape of this argument suggests four main questions.  First, is this sort of 
mental commitment feasible, or psychologically possible?  Second, what is the criterion 
for “doing better” – what is the first-best that Burkean second-order traditionalism hopes 
to track, over an array of cases?  Third, why is tradition the right second-order guidepost, 
as opposed to, say, the findings of law and economics, the platform of the Republican 
party, or the teachings of Zoroaster?  Finally, what are the implications of the Burkean 
approach for constitutional adjudication?  I take up the last question in detail in I.B. and 
I.C.  Here I offer some brief remarks on the first three questions. 
The mental commitment to a second-order rule – in this case, following tradition 
– may seem psychologically mysterious.  Suppose a case where, to the decisionmaker’s 
unaided reason, it seems indisputable that X, whereas tradition says Y; will not the 
second-order commitment break down?  In fact, however, nothing is more common than 
such commitments, which are often patently sensible and quite stable, although the 
psychological mechanisms that support them are as yet poorly understood.  If for some 
reason I must solve a series of math problems, I might do best to always adopt the 
solution that a colleague from the mathematics department suggests, even if in particular 
cases I am strongly convinced that the answer is otherwise.  Of course math problems 
(often) have right answers, but we will see that the epistemic interpretation of 
Burkeanism assumes this as well.  Moreover, some theorists envision Burkean 
adjudication not as an iron-clad commitment, but as a presumption or a rule with 
exceptions, and thus as defeasible in particular cases where the Burkean judge’s first-
order views or judgments are particularly strong.  “[A] rationalistic account of 
traditionalism just establishes a requirement that one give the benefit of the doubt to past 
practices.  If one is quite confident that a practice is wrong . . . this conception of 
traditionalism permits the practice to be eroded or even discarded.”
7
                                                 
7 See Strauss, supra note 5. 
  5  
  Limits of Reason 
A more troublesome question about the second-order interpretation of 
Burkeanism is: what exactly is the first-order good that following tradition promotes?  If 
tradition is of derivative value, as an epistemic aid, of what value is it derivative?  But it 
is wrong to assume that there must be some single first-level answer.  If Burkeanism is a 
second-order epistemic strategy, it can be used by decisionmakers with differing first-
order commitments.
8  Burkeans with various first-order theories about what makes 
outcomes good, or valuable, or just, can converge on the second-order value of tradition, 
without settling their theoretical differences.  It is perfectly coherent, whether or not 
correct, for a judge who believes that maximizing “welfare” (somehow understood) is the 
touchstone of good decisions and a judge who believes that respecting “justice” 
(somehow understood) is the touchstone of good decisions to agree on the second-order 
epistemic value of tradition, as a guide to implementing their very different first-order 
values. 
The most basic question in such cases, however, is why tradition is the second-
order guidepost, rather than something else.  For Burkeans, one prominent answer is that 
following tradition best comports with the limits of human reason; tradition embodies the 
contributions of many minds
9 in the past, in contrast to the unaided reason of an 
individual decisionmaker today.
10  Again, the many minds might be conceived as 
expressing views about welfare, or justice, or anything else; the basic idea that more 
heads are better than one or a few will remain unaffected.  Crucially, however, the insight 
about many minds can be given either an informational or an evolutionary interpretation.  
Here I will address only the former, leaving the latter to Part II.   
The Condorcet Jury Theorem provides the most obvious framework for an 
informational interpretation of Burke’s dictum; the Theorem explains why many minds 
might do better at solving problems with exogenously defined right answers than one or a 
few minds.
11  In it simplest form, the Jury Theorem states that, where there is a binary 
choice and a right answer exists, and where average competence exceeds .5 – that is, the 
average member of the group is more likely than not to choose correctly -- then the 
likelihood that a majority vote of the group will produce the right answer approaches 
certainty as the group becomes larger or as average competence increases.
12  The group’s 
                                                 
8 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). 
9 The phrase “many minds” is taken from Cass R. Sunstein, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE 
KNOWLEDGE (2006). 
10 See Merrill, supra note 5, at 519-23 (emphasizing that judicial “conventionalism” comports with 
“skepticism about the powers of human reason); Strauss, supra note 5, at 891-92 (“The central traditionalist 
idea is that one should be very careful about rejecting judgments made by people who were acting 
reflectively and in good faith, especially when those judgments have been reaffirmed or at least accepted 
over time. Judgments of this kind embody not just serious thought by one group of people, or even one 
generation, but the accumulated wisdom of many generations.”); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 370 
(articulating a Burkean theory of judicial decisionmaking and suggesting that “Burke opposes theories and 
abstractions, developed by individual minds, to traditions, built up by many minds over long periods.”); 
Young, supra note 5, at 644-647 (offering a Burkean account of the limits of human reason). 
11 For the Condorcetian interpretation of Burke, see Sunstein, supra note 5, at 370-71.  Something like the 
Condorcetian interpretation is necessarily implicit in the other accounts cited in note 5, supra. 
12 See Marquis de Condorcet, An Essay on the Application of Probability Theory to Plurality Decision-
Making (1785), in Iain McLean and Fiona Hewitt, eds, CONDORCET: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 120 (Edward Elgar 1994) (translated by editors). 
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average competence can quickly become higher than the competence even of an expert 
individual. 
The Theorem can be extended to cover more than two choices,
13 and even to 
cover cases where there is no right answer exogenous to the preferences of some defined 
group, such as the population at large.
14  The latter point implies that the Theorem need 
not be understood as addressing the aggregation of dispersed information, but it certainly 
can be interpreted to do so, and usually is.  In any event, the Condorcetian interpretation 
of Burke rests on this informational interpretation of Condorcet.  The crucial point, amid 
these complexities, is just that the aggregate decisionmaking competence of many minds 
will almost certainly exceed the competence even of the groups’ wisest members, if the 
average member is more likely than not to vote correctly.  
How exactly does the Jury Theorem relate to Burkean traditionalism?  On this 
view, traditions – including judicial traditions or lines of precedents – are seen as a series 
of “votes” that aggregate to a collective view.  That view contains a kind of latent 
wisdom, in that the collective view is under certain conditions much more likely to be 
correct than the view of any individual.  “Burke appeared to see traditions as embodying 
the judgments of many people operating over time.  If countless people have committed 
themselves to certain practices, then it is indeed probable that ‘latent wisdom’ will 
‘prevail in them,’ at least if most of the relevant people are more likely to be right than 
wrong.”
15    
On this account, the people who participate in a tradition or the judges who 
participate in developing a line of precedent lived at different times, and thus never 
participated in an actual collective vote.  The Jury Theorem does not literally require that 
the decisionmaking group ever take a collective vote under majority rule; exactly the 
same aggregative properties can be obtained just by taking the statistical mean of guesses 
from within some population of guessers.  As the number of participants becomes large, 
the median vote that prevails under majority rule will converge towards the statistical 
mean of guesses within the group.  Later I will question whether this account succeeds, 
but for now I take it as given. 
I will also put aside the standard question whether there are indeed exogenously 
defined right answers in law generally or constitutional law in particular.  Jurisprudential 
controversies abound here, between those who argue that there are right answers even in 
hard cases,
16 those who deny this,
17 and those who think that the existence of right 
answers are irrelevant, because of persistent disagreement over what the right answers 
                                                 
13 Robert E. Goodin & Christian List, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 
J. Poli. Phil. 277 (2001). 
14 This is the “polling model” interpretation of the Jury Theorem.  See Paul H. Edelman, On Legal 
Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. Legal Stud. 327 (2002); Nicholas Miller, Information, 
Electorates,
 and Democracy: Some Extensions
 and Interpretations of the
 Condorcet Jury Theorem, in 
INFORMATION POOLING AND GROUP
 DECISION MAKING 173 (Bernard Grofman
 & Guillermo Owen eds.
 
1986). 
15 Sunstein, supra note 5. 
16 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1976). 
17 For an overview of different versions of the basic thesis that law is indeterminate, at least in some cases, 
see Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 488 (Dennis Patterson ed.
 1999). 
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are.
18  The Jury Theorem (in its informational interpretation) requires only an exogenous 
right answer, and thus gets purchase on any case or legal problem where one of the 
following conditions are met: (1) there is a factual component to the legal question; (2) 
there is a prescriptive or means-end judgment about which legal ruling will best conduce 
to achieving an agreed-upon goal; (3) the legal question, although neither factual nor 
prescriptive, otherwise has a right answer somehow defined.  Few will deny that many 
cases fit one of these categories.  Even those who deny that all legal cases have right 
answers rarely deny that some cases do.    
Those who are skeptical of the right-answer thesis, in any of these senses, put 
themselves outside the informational framework altogether.  By contrast, common-law 
constitutionalists who interpret Burke in Condorcetian terms assume the existence of 
right answers, suitably defined, in constitutional adjudication.  In order to examine the 
internal logic of the argument, I will follow that assumption.  
B.  Burke as Condorcet: Internal Problems 
  Nonetheless, there remain serious obstacles to any Condorcetian interpretation of 
Burke, both in general and as applied to judicial precedent in particular.  I begin with the 
internal logic of the interpretation, before moving to comparative institutional problems. 
  1.  Precedent, Tradition, and Numbers 
  A central ambiguity within common-law constitutionalism is the slippage back 
and forth between judicial traditions – lines of precedent or doctrine – on the one hand, 
and broader societal traditions on the other.  It has been argued that the Warren Court was 
a “common-law court,” basing its decisions on experience.
19  In some cases, this claim is 
supported by pointing to earlier precedents on which the Warren Court drew.
20  Where 
the Warren Court overruled or broke dramatically from precedent, however, the claim is 
supported by pointing to larger political and social traditions said to be inconsistent with 
the discarded precedent.  Thus the innovative decisions requiring a “one person, one 
vote” standard in reapportionment cases are justified by pointing to broader historical 
trend toward expansion of the formal franchise.
21  Common-law constitutionalism that 
ranges over both precedent and tradition has multiple degrees of freedom. 
This ambiguity is often material, because the Condorcetian credentials of 
precedent may be much different than those of broader traditions.  In the case of Supreme 
Court precedents, for example, only 110 Justices have ever sat on the Court, and of those 
only a fraction have been participants in any given line of precedent.  For a Condorcetian 
analysis, numbers are critical.  When the individual reason of a lone judge or small group 
of judges is compared with traditions embodying (let us suppose) thousands or even 
millions of individual judgments, the superiority of collective wisdom is palpable.  When 
the judgments of a group of nine Justices, today, are compared with the judgments of 
                                                 
18 Cf.  Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY 
ESSAYS (Robert George ed. 1992).  
19 David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 25, 2002), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=315682.
20 See id. at 17-24.  
21 Id. at 31. 
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(say) twenty justices yesterday, the margin of superiority thins.  Moreover, by the 
Theorem’s terms, group competence is a function not only of numbers, but of average 
competence – the probability of selecting the correct answer.  If today’s justices are more 
competent than yesterday’s, the difference may swamp a small deficit in numbers.   
Shortly, I will give reasons to think that average competence indeed rises over time. 
Of course, even if that is true, the relative numbers of yesterday’s justices may 
swamp the higher competence of today’s justices; everything depends on the particular 
values of the variables, as is always true with the Jury Theorem.  The overall point 
remains, however.  Precedent, especially at the level of the Supreme Court, has a very 
different Condorcetian status than large-scale political and social traditions.  Assimilating 
the two or vacillating between them, as often happens in common-law constitutionalism, 
gives precedent an unwarranted sheen.  To the extent that the informational interpretation 
of Burke is focused on judicial traditions -- the precedents developed within courts, as 
opposed to broader social and political traditions – its Condorcetian credentials are 
suspect.  
2.  Time and Information 
There is a systematic reason for thinking that today’s justices are of higher 
average competence than yesterday’s, all else equal: today’s justices know more, just 
because they live today, not yesterday.  Bentham, following Pascal, offered a crucial 
objection to Burkean traditionalism: decisionmakers today have more information than 
decisionmakers in the past, because they enjoy the benefit of seeing how things actually 
turned out after the first round of decisions.
22 The ancients are not older than we are, and 
therefore more wise; they are younger than we are, and therefore less wise, because they 
lack whatever knowledge we have gained in the succeeding years.  Experience in this 
sense favors the moderns over the ancients.           
3.  Common Questions? 
A fundamental assumption of the Jury Theorem, where the aggregation of 
dispersed information is concerned,
23 is that voters or group members must be addressing 
the same question.  If A makes a judgment about question X and B makes a judgment 
about question Y, there is no genuine pooling of collective wisdom.  Suppose that X and 
Y superficially resemble each other, but are critically different on closer inspection.   
Then it may be easy to mistake an ersatz agreement among many minds, which looks as 
though it rests on collective wisdom but really does not, for a genuinely Condorcetian 
process. 
This ersatz collective wisdom is, plausibly, the ordinary state of judicial 
precedents extended over time.
24  Suppose that at Time 1 the justices of the Supreme 
                                                 
22 JEREMY BENTHAM, BENTHAM’S HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL FALLACIES (1952); Blaise Pascal, Preface to 
the Treatise on Vacuum, in THOUGHTS, LETTERS, AND MINOR WORKS 444, 449 (Charles W. Eliot ed., M.L. 
Booth et al. trans., 1910). 
23 This point does not hold for the polling interpretation, which we have put aside (because it is not the 
interpretation on which common-law constitutionalists rely).  In that interpretation, voters are each 
expressing their own preferences.  See Edelman, supra note 14; Miller, supra note 14.  In the informational 
interpretation, however, voters are each guessing about a common, exogenously defined right answer.  
24 Thanks to Jack Goldsmith for emphasizing this point. 
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Court hold that a state may not constitutionally ban flag-burning
25 or partial-birth-
abortion.
26  Then suppose that Congress enacts a similar statute,
27 and the 
constitutionality of that statute arises at Time 2.  Does the collective judicial judgment at 
Time 1 contain information useful at Time 2, from a Condorcetian perspective?  What 
question exactly are the justices addressing in the two cases?  It is not obvious that the 
considerations are the same.  Holmes, among others, thought that the problem of judicial 
review was very different for federal and state governments;
28 and as I shall emphasize 
shortly, the Time 2 decision poses a different question just because it is not a case of first 
impression.  None of these points turn on whether the Time 1 decision was correct, or 
not, or on what the Time 2 decision should be.  The point is that they are not the same 
decisions. 
Similar problems arise even when the earlier and later decisions involve the same 
level of government, on precisely the same constitutional issue.  Suppose that at Time 1, 
the Court decided that capital punishment did not violate “evolving standards of 
decency.”
29  Is this an informationally useful precedent if, at Time 2, the Court faces the 
same question again?  Not necessarily, because standards may have evolved even farther.  
In this example the problem of change over time is right on the surface of the doctrinal 
test, but the same problem may arise in less transparent form.  If at Time 1 the Court held 
that a certain rule of criminal procedure is or is not “implicit in ordered liberty,”
30 does 
this mean that a Court facing the same issue at Time 2 is answering the same question?  
Even if, say, the two cases are a generation or more apart?  Any account of constitutional 
interpretation and adjudication that has even a dollop of sensitivity to changed 
circumstances – which is to say most such accounts, except perhaps for the most 
stringently backward-looking forms of originalism – will code the questions that the 
justices ask in these two cases as critically different. 
Finally, and most generally, in a regime of precedent there will necessarily be a 
difference between the questions asked in cases of first impression and in all subsequent 
cases.  At Time 1 the question is what legal rule the court should adopt, at Time 2 (or 3 or 
….N) the question(s) include how much weight to give to the Time 1 precedent.  Because 
the question at Time 1 always differs from the question(s) at Time 2 (…N), one cannot 
straightforwardly aggregate information across the divide between examination and re-
examination of legal questions.  Adherence to a regime of precedent itself undermines the 
commonality of questions that is necessary for the Condorcetian interpretation of 
precedent. 
One must not overstate these points, because a slight shift in the relevant 
questions does not deprive previous precedents of all informational value to current 
decisionmakers.  Suppose that a decade ago, judges decided that a particular practice did 
                                                 
25 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
26  Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
27 Compare Texas v. Johnson, supra, with United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (federal flag-
burning statute); Stenberg v. Carhart, supra, with Gonzales v. Carhart, --- U.S. --- (2007) (federal partial-
birth abortion statute). 
28 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, in Collected Legal papers 291, 295-96 (1920).  
29 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
30 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
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not violate widespread standards of decency.  Suppose also that judges today must decide 
whether the same is true today, under an evolving standard.  It is surely relevant 
information to know that as of a decade ago, decency did not condemn the practice.  But 
we cannot straightforwardly rely on the miracle of Condorcetian aggregation in a case 
like this, because we cannot lump together in a single notional voting group two different 
sets of judges deciding two different questions.  
The Condorcetian interpretation of Burke trades on a kind of metaphor, one not 
dissimilar to Burke’s own description of tradition as the “bank and capital of ages.”  In 
the implicit metaphor of the common-law constitutionalists, the justices who have 
participated in a line of decisions are thought of as deciding in common, on the same 
question.  But in many cases, no meeting of the many minds ever occurs.  The metaphor 
here is affirmatively harmful.  It obscures that the many minds participating in the line of 
precedent answer questions that shift subtly over time with shifting circumstances, 
changed legal contexts and novel applications of preestablished legal rules. 
4.  Independence, Herding, and the Burkean Paradox 
Another critical condition for the Jury Theorem to apply (in its strongest form; I 
will explain the qualifier shortly) is that the votes or guesses that are aggregated must be 
independent of each other.  For brevity I will speak of the “requirement” of 
independence, but here too one must be careful.  Nonindependence just reduces the 
number of effective votes or guesses in the pool.  If there are ten voters, and nine utterly 
defer to a leader, guessing exactly as the leader guesses because the leader does so, then 
only one vote counts.   
This need not mean that the average competence of the group decreases.  If the 
leader is of much higher average competence than the followers, it may even increase, at 
least if the follower would otherwise be more likely to guess wrong than right.  Group 
performance, under the Jury Theorem is a function of both numbers and competence; 
deference to opinion leaders can improve performance under some conditions.
31  
Nonetheless, under a broad range of conditions, the more independence, the more 
separate judgments and dispersed information are aggregated into the group judgment, 
the better the Condorcetian credentials of the precedent. 
This criterion is often applied too stringently.  In one quite erroneous 
interpretation, independence is violated by mere deliberation, because people influence 
one anothers’ views.  However, this is false.  The independence required by the Jury 
Theorem is statistical, not causal.
32  It means that Voter 2 does not decide to vote just as 
Voter 1 votes, however that is; it does not mean that Voter 1 cannot influence Voter 2’s 
independent judgment, through discussion or otherwise.  Deliberation by itself does not 
compromise independence.   
That said, however, true failures of independence can arise from many causes.  
One cause is power – the power of ruling regimes, interest groups, or even court leaders.  
Suppose that the precedents of a given era were generated, not by statistically 
                                                 
31 David Estlund, Opinion Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet's Jury Theorem, 36 THEORY & DECISION 
131 (1994). 
32 Id.  
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independent consideration by a panel of justices, but by a panel of justices who were 
political cronies following the lead of the White House, or the lead of outside groups, or 
who (like the justices of the Marshall Court) systematically deferred to the Chief Justice.  
The reduction of independence reduces the number of effective votes.  When we turn to 
comparative institutional problems later in the discussion, the role of power will become 
important: arguments that impeach the Condorcetian credentials of other institutions, 
such as legislatures, on grounds of interest-group power or other process failures must 
consider the same possibilities with respect to judicial institutions. 
An important special case in which independence is violated involves 
informational cascades.
33  Such cascades can arise even if all actors are rational and are 
attempting to make the best possible individual guess.  Where each person has a small 
stock of private information, the rational guesser will do best to mimic the judgments of 
guessers earlier in the sequence, because their total information swamps his own.  The 
result can often be a bad equilibrium in which a long sequence of people, deferring to 
erroneous guesses earlier in the sequence, make erroneous guesses themselves.
34  This 
outcome is collectively bad but individually rational; each person followed the best 
strategy for themselves, but the outcome for all is a bad cascade. 
Cascades can occur in courts as well as in society generally; a line of precedents 
may represent little more than a rational decision by later judges to ignore their private 
information in favor of what earlier courts have said.  Where this occurs, later decisions 
in the line of precedent are not independent contributions that add to the informational 
value of the whole; although decisions accumulate, the information implicit in the line of 
precedents does not increase.  Although some argue on a priori grounds that precedential 
cascades are unlikely,
35 they have in fact been documented under quite ordinary 
conditions.
36
In some settings, cascades are fragile to small changes in information and 
motivations; although easily started, they are easily shattered as well.  In markets, 
cascades can often be dispelled by releases of information, from government or firms.  
Cascades embody surprisingly little information; after the first few guessers, all others 
are rationally following the herd.  Hence a small addition of information can cause actors 
later in the sequence to change their guesses, breaking the cascade.
37  If this fragility to 
new information worked straightforwardly in the case of precedential cascades, one 
might have reason to think that most lines of precedent represent the informational 
contributions of many minds, rather than a cascade.   
However, precedential cascades are probably relatively robust.  The reason is that 
“the passive nature of courts . . . means that erroneous decisions made by one level in a 
system of courts potentially remain uncorrected, even though all courts are trying to make 
                                                 
33 For an overview, see Sushil Bikhchandani, et al.,  Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, 
Fads, and Informational Cascades,  12 J. ECON PERSP. 151 (1998). 
34 For a simple example, see http://welch.econ.brown.edu/cascades/. 
35 Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal 73 SO. CALIF. L. REV. 87 (1999). 
36 Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and 
Herding Behavior by Courts,  1 AM. LAW. & ECON. REV. 158 (1999). 
37 Bikhchandani, et al ., supra note 32. 
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principled judgments.”
38  If the Supreme Court follows its usual practices of case 
selection, it will not grant certiorari in cases where all lower courts have cascaded to an 
agreement, and so will have no occasion to overturn the lower-court consensus.   
Litigants, seeing the lower court consensus and knowing that Supreme Court review is 
unlikely, are unlikely to challenge the consensus in the first place.  By virtue of the 
structure of the judicial system and the passivity of the courts, precedential cascades are 
plausibly less fragile than cascades in markets or society generally.  
Changes in motivation or incentives – in the reward structure of individual action 
– can also dispel cascades or prevent their arising in the first place.  Where each person is 
attempting, not to make the best possible individual guess, but to make the guess that will 
prove most useful to the group, each guesser will ignore the earlier guesses and record 
her unaided view of the problem.
39  When this happens, each guesser discloses more 
private information to be aggregated into the group judgment, and the quality of the 
group judgment improves.  The same effect can arise not from incentives, but from 
cognitive quirks.  Irrationally overconfident individuals contribute a great deal to the 
group; precisely because they are overconfident, they tend to contribute private 
information that can help to block or shatter cascades.
40  
The significance of all this is to reveal a tension at the foundations of the Burkean 
view – what I will call the Burkean paradox.  The paradox is that if many participants in 
the line of precedent or tradition followed the precedent or tradition (rather than 
exercising their independent reason) because doing do was a way to improve their 
information, then the informational value of the tradition is lower to that extent; there are 
fewer independent minds contributing to the collective wisdom.  Tradition itself becomes 
a kind of informational cascade, which lowers the informational value of tradition 
overall.  The sting in the problem is that a strategy that is individually rational for judges 
at any given time – following precedent or tradition -- is harmful to all if followed by all, 
because it drains precedent or tradition of any epistemic value.  Burkeanism might even 
be analogous to a kind of informational pollution, giving rise to severe problems of 
collective action: it is individually rational but collectively harmful for individual 
decisionmakers to rely on tradition, rather than unaided reason.  
Obviously much depends on the specifics of the cascade at issue.  Some cascades 
can cause stampedes in the right direction, not the wrong direction (according to 
whatever exogenous definition of right answers we have assumed).  And cascades are 
fragile in many ways, tending to shatter as circumstances change.  But to the extent that 
tradition rests on cascades, rather than the independent and unaided contributions of 
many minds, Burkean praise for precedent is self-defeating.  The best contributions to the 
stream of precedent are those in which individual judges, or small groups of judges, do 
exercise their unaided reason.  Those who rely on tradition because it is the “bank and 
capital of ages” make withdrawals from the common pool of information, for their 
private benefit; those who exercise their unaided reason contribute to the common pool, 
for the good of all.     
                                                 
38 Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 34 at 159. 
39 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 66-67 (2003). 
40 See Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivo Welch, On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs, 10 J. 
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 301 (2001).   
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5.  Random or Correlated Biases
41
Another strand of Bentham’s critique of the common law centered on the 
professional self-dealing of “Judge and Company”.  The judges and lawyers who 
administered the common law of England, on this view, constituted an elite guild who 
arranged the legal system in ways that benefited the legal profession, to the harm of the 
polity at large.  Bentham interpreted this claim by diagnosing Judge and Company as 
promoters of their “sinister interests” (a motivational distortion) or as in the grip of 
“interest-begotten prejudice” (a cognitive distortion arising from a motivational 
distortion).
42
However, we may also interpret Bentham’s core concern in less sinister terms, 
and in a way that fits comfortably within the framework of the Jury Theorem.  In this 
interpretation, the decisions made by Judge and Company are less accurate than might 
otherwise be the case because judges suffer from correlated biases.  We must distinguish 
two issues, competence and the direction of error.  Competence is the likelihood that an 
individual or an average group member will err.  But if group members err, it is best if 
their errors are uncorrelated – if they are as likely to err in one direction as another.  
Where error is randomly distributed, biased guesses in either direction wash out, on 
average, and true guesses prevail.
43   
Random distribution of bias is a major force behind the Jury Theorem.  Where 
errors are correlated – where group members are subject to a common and systematic 
bias that causes them to err in only one direction – group performance can fall 
dramatically.  The chance of a majority selecting the right answer varies inversely with 
the correlation of bias across the group.  This implies that under plausible conditions a 
group of lower average competence, but with uncorrelated biases, will outperform a 
group with higher average competence but highly correlated biases.  Counterintuitively, 
the effect of correlated biases is so strong that adding worse-than-random guessers to a 
group can improve overall performance if their biases are negatively correlated with 
those of highly competent experts.
44  Here too, of course, everything depends upon the 
precise numbers, but the crucial point is that “the uninformed voters drive the average 
correlation down, thus more than compensating for their relative ignorance.”
45
From a Benthamite perspective, the problem is that Judge and Company are likely 
to have highly correlated biases, arising both from a common socioeconomic background 
                                                 
41 Parts of this sub-section draw upon Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices? (forthcoming 
Stanford Law Review 2007).  
42 Bentham, supra note 22.  
43  There is a similarity here to Cardozo’s idea that “[t]he eccentricities of judges balance one another” so 
that “out of the attrition of diverse minds there is beaten something which has a[n] . . . average value 
greater than its component elements.”  See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 177 (1921). 
44 Krishna Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. OF POLI. 
SCI. 617, 628 (1992). 
45 Id. at 629.  In Ladha’s example, a group of three decisionmakers each competent at the .8 level cannot be 
certain of getting the right answer whatever the voting rule.  However, if the group adds two uninformed, 
worse-than-random guessers, whose competence is a mere .3, then the group is certain to choose the right 
answer so long as the guesses of the uninformed are negatively correlated with those of the informed.  See 
id. 
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and from their common professional training.  On one view, “most lawyers, whatever 
their background, have a narrow, professionally inflected perspective on governance.”
46  
Even more broadly, the values of lawyers as lawyers often have the “smell of the lamp” 
about them.
47  As compared either to ordinary people or to other professionals, lawyers 
are generally more introverted, more rational as opposed to emotional, more judgmental, 
more competitive, aggressive and materialistic;
48 they also have distinctive policy 
biases.
49
Suppose that lawyers do have correlated biases.  Suppose, for example, that 
lawyers and hence judges are likely to systematically err on the high side when they 
attempt to estimate the costs and benefits of additional legal process in government 
decisionmaking, and thus will tend to require government to afford extra increments of 
process whose social costs are greater than its social benefits.
50  As compared to a group 
whose errors are randomly distributed, the guesses of a group of past lawyers – the judges 
deciding the cases now relied upon as precedent – are less likely to track right answers 
about the value of process.  This reduces the informational value of the precedents to 
future judges who are trying to draw aid from many judicial minds in the past.   
The key point is not that judges are likely to get things wrong; it is that when they 
do get things wrong, they are likely to err in systematic rather than random ways.  The 
correlation of biases across the decisionmaking group trades off against the competence 
of the group’s members.  Even if judges are elite experts, of very high average 
competence, their likemindedness reduces group performance overall, narrowing the 
margin of superiority between the performance of a single judge or group of judges 
exercising their unaided reason today, and a judge or group of judges drawing on 
precedent.  This is an updating of Bentham’s critique of legal and judicial 
professionalism: rather than point to motivational distortions on the point of lawyers and 
judges, one may also claim that common professional training reduces the informational 
quality of judicial decisionmaking, even if all judges and lawyers are sincere.   
C.  Burke, Condorcet and Constitutional Law: Comparative Institutional Problems 
  So far we have examined some problems that arise within the logic of the 
Condorcetian interpretation of Burke, both as applied to social traditions in general and as 
applied to judicial precedent in particular.  Here I will turn to problems with 
                                                 
46 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 128 (2003). 
47 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 59 (1980). 
48 Susan Swaim Daicoff, LAWYER, KNOW THYSELF 40-42 (2002) 
49 Three relevant claims, in roughly descending order of rigor, are that: (1) legal training gives lawyers a 
strong status quo orientation and a bias to conventional morality, as compared to similarly educated adults, 
see Lawrence J. Landwehr, Lawyers as Social Progressives or Reactionaries: The Law and Order 
Cognitive Orientation of Lawyers, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 39-51 (1982), and June Louin Tapp & 
Felicia J. Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1974); (2) 
legal training reduces law students’ general concern for social justice, see, e.g., Susan Kay, Socializing the 
Future Elite: The Nonimpact of Law School, 59 SOC. SCI. Q. 347 (1978), and reduces their interest in public 
service or public-interest lawyering, see Robert Granfield, Learning Collective Eminence: Harvard Law 
School, 33 SOC. Q. 503 (1992); (3) legal training causes lawyers to favor cumbersome and complicated 
processes for generating policy, see, e.g., Jerald Auerbach, A Plague of Lawyers, HARPER’S, Oct. 1976, at 
37. 
50 Cf. Auerbach, supra note 47. 
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constitutional precedent in particular.  In constitutional adjudication, comparative 
institutional problems become critical.  A judge or group of judges deciding cases at a 
given time may turn to the information embodied in past precedent to improve their 
decisionmaking; the Condorcetian interpretation of Burke describes the conditions under 
which using precedent in this way will improve upon the unaided reason of current 
judges.  Yet in the constitutional setting, there are always alternative sources of 
information available: the judgments of past constitutional framers, of current 
legislatures, and of the current executive.  Even if the collective wisdom of many past 
judges is superior to that of one or a few present judges, on Condorcetian grounds, it does 
not at all follow that the collective wisdom of many past judges is superior to that of 
other institutions.    
  1.  Past Judges and Framers 
  In many cases, the principal target of common-law constitutionalists is 
originalism, which is the view that the Constitution should be interpreted according to its 
public meaning at the time of enactment.
51  As against the originalist view, common-law 
constitutionalists offer a vision of cases unfolding over time and embodying the 
aggregated wisdom of many minds.  Common-law constitutionalists see the text as a 
starting point for a process of incremental traditionalism, in Burkean fashion.  In this 
opposition, originalism suffers from a dead hand problem – why should the views of past 
framers control the living? – while common-law constitutionalism is a form of living 
constitutionalism. 
  But which approach is better on informational grounds?  Here we must 
distinguish originalism as a first-best view from originalism as a second-order 
decisionmaking strategy.  On the former version, originalists claim that the original 
understanding just is what the Constitution means, perhaps what any written constitution 
necessarily means.  To engage in interpretation is, necessarily, to ask about what the 
framers or ratifiers of a document understood it to mean.
52  On the latter version, 
originalism is a strategy of second-order rationality, just like common-law 
constitutionalism.  “Given a sufficiently good constitutional text, originalists maintain 
that better results will be reached overall if government officials – including judges – 
must stick to the original meaning rather than empowering them to trump that meaning 
with one they prefer.”
53  Here too, different originalists might have different accounts of 
what first-order value – welfare, justice, and so on – is served by this strategy; 
originalism would represent a lower-level converging agreement across these camps on a 
method of constitutional interpretation.   
                                                 
51 I take this “public meaning” originalism to have become the standard version, superceding the older 
“framers’ intentions” version of originalism.  The differences between them make no difference to the 
analysis here. 
52 Gary S. Lawson, On Reading Recipes -- And Constitutions, 85 Georgetown L Rev, 1823 (1997); 
Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left-Wing Professors Are Wrong for 
America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207 (2006).  
53  Randy Barnett & Cass Sunstein, Legal Affairs Debate Club, Constitution in Exile?, May 3, 2005, at 
http:// legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_cie0505.msp.
  16  
  Limits of Reason 
The relevant point, however, is just that originalists too can, and have, claimed 
that the highest source of latent wisdom is the text and original understanding.
54  For 
second-order originalists – those who think that originalism is a good second-order 
strategy for constitutional adjudication, rather than an account of the essence of 
interpretation – a useful claim is that text and original understanding are informationally 
superior to other sources of law that judges might draw upon in constitutional cases.  
Below, I will offer some reason to doubt the truth of this claim, but it is theoretically 
crucial.  It emphasizes that common-law constitutionalists must consider the 
informational credentials of all relevant sources of law before declaring in favor of a 
regime of strong precedent.  
  We must be clear to be careful about what comparison is being made, exactly.  
Sometimes, perhaps often, original texts and understandings are ambiguous, or general;  
in such cases common-law constitutionalists invoke precedent to supplement the original 
understanding, rendering it sufficiently specific to determine the outcome of litigated 
cases.  When this is so, the informational content of originalism and the informational 
content of common-law constitutionalism are additive; text, history and precedent are 
supplements, not competitors.    
Still, this is not always so.  The testing case for both originalism and common-law 
constitutionalism occurs when (let us stipulate) there is a clear original understanding, a 
clear line of precedent, and the two are in conflict.
55  Should the views of framers and 
ratifiers or the views of later judges prevail?  Let us suppose that, despite the internal 
problems surveyed above, a stream of precedents does embody aggregated wisdom or 
information that is superior to that of a single judge or small group of judges today.  Still, 
it is a very different question whether that stream of precedent is informationally superior 
to the views of framers and ratifiers in the past. 
We will assume that the necessary conditions for a Condorcetian analysis are 
satisfied; in other words, that all members of the relevant groups (framers, ratifiers, and 
later judges) were addressing a common question, voted sincerely and so on.  What is the 
relative average competence of the decisionmaking groups being compared?  Which 
group will be more likely to answer the relevant questions correctly?  From an 
informational perspective, there are many difficult issues to be untangled, because the 
tradeoffs are numerous and cross-cutting.   
On Benthamite grounds, but contrary to Bentham’s own prejudices, past judges 
have an informational advantage over framers and ratifiers of the even more remote past, 
all else equal.  This is a central point of common-law constitutionalism: post-framing 
judges have had the opportunity to learn from experience
56 or to acquire new information 
about the costs and benefits of framing-era choices.  In Condorcetian terms, more 
information yields higher average competence. 
                                                 
54 Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments 
for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311 
(2005). 
55 For putative examples, see Calabresi, supra note 53.  Nothing in the discussion here turns on whether 
these examples are correct, a question on which I express no view. 
56 See Strauss, Common-Law Genius, supra note. 
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However, other considerations are relevant as well.  On some views, the framers 
were superior statesmen, possessed of extremely high competence that might compensate 
or more than compensate for their relative lack of information.  One might explain this 
higher wisdom of the framers (if it exists) either by a selection mechanism or by 
reference to the circumstances of the founding era.  As for selection, one might hold that 
the framers were the elite of the nation, selected from among the notables of their states, 
as opposed to later judges who often took the bench through cronyism or party service.  
As for circumstances, one might believe that emergencies and national crises produce 
sharpened cognition in lawmakers, because the costs of making mistakes are higher, and 
that crises produce emotional states – of solidarity with contemporary citizens and with 
future generations – that induce more effort for the public good. 
Even if neither selection nor unusual emotional states suffice to induce 
extraordinary competence in constitutional framers, the high costs of information in 
founding eras can help along other Condorcetian margins.  Behind the “veil of 
uncertainty,”
57 lack of information makes it equally e a s y  t o  e r r  i n  one direction or 
another.  Sincere framers attempting to guess the welfare-maximizing constitutional rule 
will know less than later generations, but will also be less biased, precisely because they 
are less likely to know the rule’s distributive consequences for themselves, their friends, 
family, profession or social class.  There is thus a tradeoff between the framers’ relative 
lack of information about the consequences of the rules they adopt, on the one hand, and 
their relative impartiality, on the other.
58  In the Jury Theorem’s terms, lack of 
information reduces competence, but pervasive uncertainty reduces the correlation of 
biases and pushes the whole group towards randomly distributed error, which is 
desirable.      
Furthermore, there is a crucial problem of numbers, rarely discussed by common-
law constitutionalists.  Burke did not clearly distinguish tradition from judicial precedent, 
but we have seen that a major distinction between the two is that the numbers involved in 
the latter are much smaller, especially at the Supreme Court level.  The problem bites 
hard when a Condorcetian interpretation of precedent is compared to a Condorcetian 
interpretation of originalism.  The framers and ratifiers, taken as a group, were a large 
body, even in the small population of 18
th-century America.  To be sure, they were also 
an internally heterogeneous group, and it seems plausible that the average competence of 
the framers was higher than the average competence of the ratifiers.  But so long as the 
latter were more likely to get the answer right than wrong, on average, their numbers 
virtually guarantee that they would have done so.  With a voting population of, say, one 
thousand framers and ratifiers, a very low average competence (so long as it is greater 
than . 5) suffices to all but guarantee a correct answer. 
No such guarantee is possible for the relative handful of justices, slightly more 
than one hundred, who have ever sat on the Supreme Court; and of course for any given 
precedent, the number of justices who have ever voted in the relevant sequence of cases 
is much smaller than that.  This comparison looks better if the lens is expanded beyond 
                                                 
57 John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, in Utilitarianism and Beyond 39, 44-46 
(Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). 
58 ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL Ch. 1 
(forthcoming 2007). 
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precedent, properly so-called, to include lower-court judges, academics providing 
background commentary, and other participants in the ongoing legal community that 
surrounds the Court.  That expansion, however, is itself problematic on several grounds.  
The first is that it strains the requirement of a common question.  Lower courts, for 
example, often do not ask the same question as the Supreme Court, precisely because 
they are lower courts and thus have a hierarchical obligation to respect the Court’s 
precedent, an obligation with no analogues on the Court itself.  The second is that behind 
the framers and ratifiers there also stand broader intellectual communities; why should 
not their “votes” be aggregated as well?   
In the hardest case, where subsequent precedent contradicts text and original 
understanding, it is not obvious that framers and ratifiers as a decisionmaking group are 
inferior, along dimensions of information and effective aggregation, to a series of later 
judges.  Everything depends on particulars, and few generalizations are possible.  This 
means that if the main target of common-law constitutionalism is originalism, and the 
main weapon for striking the target is the Condorcetian theory of information-
aggregation, then the strike largely misses its mark.   
None of this is intended to defend originalism, which is presumptively 
objectionable on Benthamite grounds: all else equal, changing circumstances demand that 
decisions be made not by the framers of centuries ago, but by decisionmakers with better 
current information, especially as the founding era and the last major episodes of formal 
constitutional revision (Reconstruction and the Progressive era) recede into the distant 
past.  The only point here is that common-law constitutionalism has yet to come to grips 
with the problem that an informational defense of precedent must consider, and compete 
with, an informational defense of text and original understanding. 
  2.  Past Judges and Current Legislatures: Burke, Condorcet and Thayer 
  A different comparison is between (1) a line of judicial precedent that announces 
some rule and (2) a statute that contradicts that rule.  In order to bias the inquiry in favor 
of common-law constitutionalism, I will assume that when the statute is enacted there is 
already a clear and consistent line of Supreme Court precedent to the contrary, and that 
the underlying constitutional provisions are ambiguous, vague or general.  This must be 
the best case for common-law constitutionalism, insofar as overriding the view of current 
legislatures is concerned. 
  However, in cases of this type, the same Condorcetian arguments that common-
law constitutionalists deploy against originalism also support judicial deference to the 
views of current legislatures.  Precedent might beat original text, but be beaten in turn by 
current statutes.  If that is so, then the logical consequence of the informational 
interpretation of Burke is not robust judicial review, in the style of the Warren Court; 
rather it is deference to legislative judgments.  On this account, Burke leads via 
Condorcet to James Bradley Thayer, who argued for judicial deference to current 
legislatures in all but the clearest cases of legislative mistake.
59
                                                 
59 See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
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To make progress on these issues, let us temporarily stipulate to some crucial 
assumptions that I shall examine in the subsequent discussion.  First, suppose that the 
legislators who enact the statute and the courts who review it both address the common 
question of its constitutionality (whether or not the legislators also address its merits as 
policy).  Second, suppose that the legislators who voted for a statute are on average more 
likely to get that question right than wrong, as are the judges who review it.  Third, 
suppose that both legislators and judges sincerely vote their views of the statute’s 
constitutionality.   
Given these assumptions, several stylized facts about legislatures threaten to give 
them an overwhelming Condorcetian advantage: the sheer numerosity of their members, 
their voting practices, and their powerful tools for acquiring information.  I will take up 
each of these in turn, beginning with numbers.  It is overwhelmingly likely that 
legislatures with hundreds of members proceeding under majority rule will vote correctly, 
even if their average competence is near-random, just because of their sheer numbers.  
With 435 voters (the number of voters with full participation in the House of 
Representatives), a majority vote with average competence of only ___ will yield a ___ 
chance of obtaining the right answer.  In comparative terms, even if the average 
competence of justices is much higher than that of legislators, it is extremely unlikely that 
the nine justices sitting at any one time, or even the few dozens of justices who 
participate in a line of precedent, can do better, just because it is hard to improve on a 
vote that is almost certainly correct.  Suppose that the justices are much better lawyers 
than, say, the average senator or even than the members of the judiciary committees.  Not 
much follows.  The distinctively Condorcetian contribution is that numbers matter; many 
near-incompetents can do better than a small panel of elite experts. 
Quite obviously, the crucial question here is whether legislators’ average 
competence is greater or less than one-half (in the two-option case).  I put aside the 
erroneous argument that legislators might always raise their competence to .5 by flipping 
a coin; as is now well-known, this overlooks that an incompetent voter might not realize 
his own incompetence.  The more serious problem is that, as Condorcet himself 
suggested, average legislative competence might slip below the crucial threshold of one-
half precisely because of the large number of members.  “A very numerous assembly 
cannot be composed of very enlightened men. . . . The more numerous the assembly, the 
more it will be exposed to the risk of making false decisions.”
60  However, we should not 
overstate the problem.  We need only enough confidence in the mechanisms of legislative 
decisionmaking to believe that legislators are on average only slightly better to get the 
relevant question right than wrong.  If the undemanding threshold is met, then numbers 
will tell.     
Legislative institutions help to push individual legislators up to this threshold.  
Begin with voting practices.  In most legislatures on most issues, voting occurs relatively 
simultaneously.
61  Bentham observed that the simultaneity of legislative voting 
                                                 
60 Condorcet: Selected Writings 49 (Keith M. Baker ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1976) (1785). 
61 When the House leadership held open voting for three hours to allow time to round up members to vote 
for a controversial prescription drug bill in 2003, an outcry resulted.  The new Democratic Congress elected 
at the end of 2006 limited this practice by providing that votes may not be held open “for the sole purpose 
  20  
  Limits of Reason 
dampened “undue influence,” because legislators vote in ignorance of how other 
legislators have actually voted.
62  By contrast, where all the judges who participated in a 
stream of precedents over time are aggregated into a notional voting group, later judges 
know how earlier judges voted and can defer to their predecessors – the sort of rational 
imitation that yields information cascades. 
Most important are the institutional determinants of legislative information.  By 
virtue of the extreme internal specialization of the committee system, large legislative 
staffs, and the professionalism of the legislative career (at the federal level and in many 
states, though not all), modern legislatures are engines for generating and processing 
information.  The seniority norm and the proliferation of subcommittees imply that a 
member of the modern House of Representatives spends many years becoming deeply 
expert in a narrow slice of public policy.
63  This has two cross-cutting effects.  On the 
one hand, specialization raises the average competence of members, including members 
who have influence on constitutional questions, such as members of the judiciary 
committees.  On the other hand, floor deference to the committees reduces the number of 
effectively independent votes.  The upshot is a smaller number of more competent votes, 
and the result is unclear.  But it is not implausible to think that average competence in a 
modern legislature, highly professionalized and specialized by virtue of an elaborately 
reticulated committee system, is much higher than in legislatures of the 18
th century. 
So too, as compared to courts, legislators plausibly have better information than 
judges about the factual components and causal consequences of their constitutional 
decisions.  Here the main tradeoff is between evenhandedness and information.  Judicial 
procedures are designed to ensure equality of inputs, a form of evenhandedness.  This is 
basically a leveling-down strategy of institutional design: by virtue of prohibitions on ex 
parte contacts and equal time for briefing and argument, no party has an advantage in 
presenting information to the judges.  Moreover, the lack of any electoral connection on 
the part of federal judges gives them a remoteness from current politics.  The price of this 
evenhandedness and remoteness, however, is a relative dearth of information.
64  
Legislators hear from many more interests and social sectors, in both formal and informal 
ways.  Aggregating across some dozens of judicial minds ameliorates this problem, but 
does not plausibly overcome the massive initial advantage of legislative numbers and 
specialization in the Condorcetian framework. 
3.  Endogenous Information and Rational Ignorance  
  A further set of considerations that bear on the Condorcetian credentials of 
current legislatures involves incentives to acquire information.  The basic problem is that 
the amount of information each voter (whether legislator or judge) decides to acquire is 
endogenous to the size of the voting group.  In large legislatures, each legislator has an 
incentive to remain rationally ignorant.  The legislator will invest less in informing 
herself about the questions at hand if she estimates that, because of the legislature’s large 
                                                                                                                                                 
of reversing the outcome.”  See House Rule XX, clause 2(a), available at 
http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/house_rules.htm. 
62 See Jeremy Bentham, POLITICAL TACTICS (Michael James et al. eds. 1999) 106-07. 
63 KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991). 
64 See Neil Komesar, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
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size, she is extremely unlikely to be the decisive voter in any event.  More generally, 
information and deliberation are collective goods in legislatures; each member may 
attempt to free ride on the expertise of others.   
All else equal, these considerations tend to undercut the informational advantages 
of legislatures.  On this view, the comparative advantage of courts is their relatively small 
size.  By raising each judge’s probability of being the pivotal voter, the incentive to 
acquire information is greater, and it is easier for all members of the group to engage in 
mutual monitoring of free riders.  On a nine-member Supreme Court, each justice has a 
nontrivial chance of being the swing voter, and colleagues will notice and disapprove if a 
justice acquires no information before voting. 
However, these considerations are themselves in turn undercut by other features 
of legislatures.  It is not clear, in the abstract, how the endogeneity of information nets 
out against the sheer numerosity of legislators.  In some models of electoral voting, a 
large number of voters whose information is quite poor due to the rational ignorance 
problem can nonetheless be almost certain of getting the correct answer, just because 
numbers count.
65  The difference between a Supreme Court of nine members and a 
Congress of more than four or five hundred is plausibly too large – the initial 
Condorcetian advantages of the latter group are plausibly too great – to be sensitive to 
differential incentives to acquire information. 
Furthermore, legislators often abstain from voting, whereas justices very rarely do 
so.  Rational abstention can allow uninformed legislators to, in effect, defer to colleagues 
who are known to be well-informed, thus raising the chance that the decisive vote will be 
cast by a well-informed voter.
66  Of course legislators who abstain often do so, in fact, for 
less high-minded reasons, but we are assuming sincere and public-spirited behavior on all 
sides in order to focus on the informational comparison between legislatures and courts.  
Finally, the relatively large size of legislatures merely reduces legislators’ 
incentives to acquire information as part of the legislative process.  It does not remove 
whatever information they begin with or acquire for other reasons.  Analogously, in 
electoral models of rational ignorance, it has been pointed out that “[i]t is reasonable to 
believe that voters are involuntarily exposed to a flow of political information in the 
course of everyday activities”; the consequence is that even under rational ignorance, 
“successful information aggregation is possible because the information acquired by each 
voter goes to zero but it does so slowly enough to allow the effect of large numbers to 
kick in.”
67  As discussed above, it seems plausible that legislators begin with much more 
relevant information than do judges.  Legislators acquire information relevant to 
judgments of constitutionality – information about societal mores and evolving standards 
of decency, the consequences of constitutional decisions, and the facts on which 
                                                 
65 See infra note. 
66 Cf. Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, The Swing Voters’ Curse, 86 AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
REVIEW (1996) 408-24 (discussing conditions under which uninformed voters will rationally abstain).  
67 Cesar Martinelli, Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 
(2005) at 2-3.  See also Minoru Kitahara and Yohei Sekiguchi, Condorcet Jury Theorem or Rational 
Ignorance? (working paper 2005) at 3 (showing conditions under which “[e]ven if the amount of 
information acquired by each voter is small, the amount of aggregated information can be large enough to 
[reach] the correct decision”). 
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constitutional decisions rest – through their close contacts with constituents, government 
policymakers and the broader society.  By contrast, informational impoverishment is a 
principal cost of the judges’ insulation from the hurly-burly of government policy.  So 
legislators’ relative disincentive to acquire more information through the legislative 
process, if it exists, may not matter very much in light of legislators’ initial informational 
advantages, just as a runner who gets a cramp may still win if her lead was large enough 
to begin with. 
4.  Legislatures and Precedent 
So far I have been speaking of the decisions of “current legislatures,” but this 
understates the information contained in legislation, which also draws on legislative 
traditions and precedents; there is thus a Condorcetian case for common-law legislatures 
that parallels the case for common-law courts.  Like courts, legislatures aggregate over 
many minds, not only by virtue of legislatures’ large memberships at any one time, but 
by using a kind of internal precedent, thus including the judgments of past legislators in 
current decisionmaking. 
It is sometimes suggested that courts use precedent, while legislatures do not.  All 
legislatures, on this view, act on a blank slate so far as formal law is concerned,
68 while 
courts are in some sense legally “bound” by precedent.  Incremental and cumulative 
decisionmaking is integral to the judicial process, but no legislature is formally bound by 
past enactments, although past enactments of course set a policy status quo and thus 
allocate the burden of inertia in one way or another. 
There is a confusion or slippage here between formal and functional arguments.  
The Condorcetian argument for judicial reliance on precedent has nothing to do with the 
legally binding force of precedent, whatever that means; it would be exactly the same in a 
system that had no such formal norm or rule.  The Condorcetian argument is just that 
judges will do better, in their current decisions, by drawing on the latent information 
embodied in precedent.  A system of judicial precedent economizes on the costs of 
decisionmaking – both process costs and error costs. 
There is a parallel argument in legislatures.  Even though legislatures are never 
formally bound by earlier enactments, and can always repeal internal rules, rational 
legislators will use past statutes and internal legislative interpretations of statutes and 
legislative rules as informational aids, economizing on process costs and reducing errors.  
This is not the same as the point that extant law creates a default status quo that must be 
overcome to enact new legislation.  The informational use of legislative precedents 
                                                 
68 Under the conventional view, legislatures may not entrench statutes by making it harder for a future 
legislature to repeal the statute than it was for the original legislature to enact it.  For a critique of this view, 
see Adrian Vermeule & Eric A. Posner, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 
(2002).  For critiques of the critique, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality 
of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483 (1995); John C. Roberts & 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 
91 CAL. L. REV. 1773 (2003). 
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applies even if those statutes are no longer legally in effect.  A lapsed statute or rule may 
contain information relevant to designing new rules or policies in the present.
69
It is thus the routine stuff of legislative business for legislators to relay on past 
statutes, rules and internal interpretations of both as precedents, in this informational 
sense.  Drafters of new legislation often use old legislation as a starting point, modifying 
it to fit new problems and circumstances.  Legislators will point to predecessor statutes to 
show that the body has already been regulating in a given field, or that past policy 
experiments have worked well and should be expanded, or that past policies have not 
worked well, or that policy in a given field is “settled.”  And precedents dominate 
internal legislative interpretation, by house parliamentarians and legislators, of internal 
rules. 
These points apply in the constitutional arena as well.  Whether or not one thinks 
it useful to attach the label of “super-statutes”
70 to statutes that have somehow acquired a 
vaguely “constitutional” nimbus, legislatures clearly do enact statutes with a view to 
liquidating or construing an ambiguous constitutional text, and these statutes often 
become de facto entrenched over time.  The mechanisms of this entrenchment are poorly 
understood,
71 but one such mechanism is plausibly Condorcetian.  Present legislators 
may rely upon what past legislators did, not because they are in any sense bound by those 
decisions, but because they wish to incorporate and use the information latent in those 
decisions.  Consider the decision, by a Republican-controlled Congress, to renew the 
Voting Rights Act in 2006 without substantial opposition, and with many legislators from 
both parties arguing that the Act is now part of the legal fabric.
72  That the Act was due to 
sunset, and actually had to be affirmatively renewed, emphasizes that legislators’ use of 
past statutes as precedent does not depend on whether the past statute is still the status 
quo, or rather has lapsed. 
We may describe this lawmaking strategy as Burkean, in the sense that current 
legislators do not rely solely upon their private stock of reason.  Even if judicial 
precedent, possibly drawing upon broader societal traditions, aggregates latent 
information relevant to constitutional law, the episode of the Voting Right Act suggests 
that legislatures too are common-law constitutionalists.  Praise for the latent wisdom 
contained in precedent says nothing at all about the crucial comparative question, which 
is whether common-law constitutionalism is best carried out in legislatures or in courts, 
where the outcomes of these two processes conflict. 
                                                 
69 Symmetrically, this implies that on the Condorcetian interpretation of precedent, judges should count 
overruled cases as information, despite their null legal status.  Suppose that at Time 1 nine justices voted 
unanimously for Rule R, but then at Time 2 a different nine justices voted 5-4 to overrule the Time 1 
precedent in favor of rule –R.  Putting aside the problem that the judges at Times 1 and 2 were not really 
addressing the same questions (because only the former was a case of first impression), a judge sitting at 
Time 3 should aggregate over the whole group of eighteen justices, counting the “vote” as 13-5 in favor of 
R.   
70 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes: The New American Constitutionalism, in THE 
LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH 320 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds.
 2006). 
71 For some speculations, see id. 
72 The Act was renewed with support from the Republican House leadership.  It passed the House by a vote 
of 390-33, and the Senate by a vote of 98-0.  See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_Rights_Act#Periodic_renewal. 
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The upshot is that if judges draw on the contributions of many minds aggregated 
in past judicial decisions, legislators draw on the contributions of many minds aggregated 
in past legislative decisions.  Recall the counterintuitive argument that the Warren Court 
was actually a “common-law court,” in the sense that its major decisions were traceable 
to background lines of judicial precedent or broader political traditions.
73  By the same 
token, one might make out a case that the Congress of some innovative era was actually a 
common-law Congress.  An example is the Endangered Species Act of 1973, sometimes 
described as a statute that made a radical break with the past, but which actually built 
upon the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969 and the Endangered Species 
Preservation Act of 1966, as well as even earlier legislation and treaties applicable to 
migratory birds and federal lands.
74  Of course this sort of case might be more or less 
convincing or strained, but the same is true of the argument that most of the major 
Warren Court decisions had roots in precedent.  What the example shows is that any 
categorical distinction between precedent-using courts and memoryless legislatures, 
forever acting on a blank slate, is a cartoon. 
  5.  Past Judges and the Current Executive:  Roosevelt and Condorcet 
  Some of the same considerations hold, with appropriate modifications, for 
executive branch decisionmaking.  It is not clear, on Condorcetian grounds, that the 
aggregated information embodied in a line of precedent is superior to the information 
contained in executive branch decisionmaking.  In a sense the executive branch contains 
many more minds, at any given time, even than Congress, whose staff of twenty-odd 
thousand employees is dwarfed by the hundreds of thousands of (non-military) personnel 
employed by the executive.  This is misleading, because the internal organization of the 
executive branch is more hierarchical than that of legislatures, at least in American 
legislatures, with their relatively weak party discipline.  In Condorcetian terms this 
hierarchy increases intragroup deference and reduces the effective independence of the 
aggregated “votes.”  Nonetheless, the executive branch is a they, not an it; the “unitary 
executive” is a legal claim about formal lines of authority and removal that does not 
describe executive decisionmaking and has no direct relevance to a Condorcetian 
analysis.   
Because of the internal diversity of the executive branch and the multiplicity of its 
officials, it is an open question whether an executive decision aggregates more or less 
information than the decisions of judges in a regime of precedent.  Executive branch 
policy analysts are, plausibly, highly competent in the sense that they are experts in 
particular fields.  The harder question is how well executive expertise is actually used by 
decisionmakers higher in the chain; even if higher decisionmakers are sincere, and thus 
impose no political distortions on the analysts’ conclusions, they must in many cases 
select between or among competing analyses, and may do so well or poorly.  Here too, 
however, examining only the current executive understates the case; executive offices 
routinely use precedents, in the sense of prior decisions that are informationally useful 
whether or not legally binding.  There is no basis for a systematic presumption that 
judicial precedent is informationally superior to executive decisions, where these conflict.   
                                                 
73 Strauss, Common-Law Genius, supra note. 
74 Erin C. Perkins, Comment: Migratory Birds and Multiple-Use Management: Using the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act to Rejuvenate America's National Environmental Policy, 92 NW. U.L. REV. 817 (1998).  
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6.  Implications and Conclusions 
Overall, it is hard to generalize about the relative informational properties of 
common-law precedents and traditions, the original decisions of framers and ratifiers, the 
decisions of current legislatures, of the current executive, and so forth.  All one can offer 
are some comparative statics and institutional cautions.  As to competence, the lower the 
average competence of past judges, and the higher the average competence of past 
framers or ratifiers, the less likely it is that current judges should override clear text based 
on contrary subsequent precedent.  However, where circumstances change over time, the 
informational advantage of later judges will become pronounced.  Much depends on the 
rate of change in the legal and political environment, a point I underscore in Part II 
below.   
If the legal and political environment is changing rapidly, however, legislation is 
plausibly the best response of all.  Here too some general comparative statics are 
possible.  The lower the average competence of past judges, and the higher the average 
competence of current legislators, the less willing current judges should be to override 
current statutes on the basis of precedent.  On numbers, even very competent judges 
today, possessed of precedents issued by very competent judges in the past, will rarely do 
well to overrule the decisions of current legislatures, just because of their sheer relative 
numerosity, which counts for a great deal in Condorcetian terms if average competence is 
greater than one-half (in the case of two choices).   
These points are not useless, but they are not sharp tools either.  However, the 
very fact that it is hard to make further progress along these lines, in the abstract, itself 
suggests some useful generalizations.  First, common-law constitutionalists must beware 
of a fallacious move from a explicit and valid
75 comparison – that the aggregated wisdom 
of many judges or participants in a tradition, over time, is superior to that of one or a few 
judges exercising their unaided reason today – to an invalid implicit comparison – that 
the aggregated wisdom embodied in precedent is superior that embodied in the 
constitutional text and original understanding, or in statutes, or in the decisions of 
executive officials.  The point is not to assert that the constitutional common law is or is 
not, in fact, superior to the alternative sources; it is that no amount of comparing one 
judge to many judges can supply the answer to the other institutional comparisons.   
Second, the very weapons that common-law constitutionalists deploy against 
originalism may be used against them by originalists, and can also be used against them 
with even greater effect by Thayerians, who can plausibly claim that an informational 
analysis plays directly to the comparative advantage of legislatures.  By invoking 
Condorcet against the originalists, the common-law constitutionalists tend to expose their 
flank.  The first virtue of any theory of constitutional adjudication is to explain why 
courts should have the power to override legislative action.  Originalism, for all its 
grievous theoretical problems on other margins, offers a straightforward account of that 
power: courts may do so when and because there is a validly enacted higher source of law 
authorizing or requiring them to do so.  By contrast the Condorcetian interpretation of 
common-law constitutionalism, and of Burke, leaves it not all obvious why judges should 
rely on precedent or even tradition to trump the views of current legislatures.  The very 
                                                 
75 Assuming away the internal problems discussed in I.A.. 
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plausible claim that many judicial minds are superior to one or a few does not give any 
leverage in making that additional, and more difficult, claim. 
To make the implications of these points more concrete, some observations about 
different legal and institutional contexts are useful.  Consider the following: 
“Burkeanism as a sword” versus “Burkeanism as a shield.”
76  An implication of 
the foregoing is that there is no sound basis for using Burkeanism as a sword – meaning 
that there is no sound basis for overriding the judgments of current legislatures or the 
executive.  The most plausible consequence of the Condorcetian analysis is Thayerism.  
In this regime, legislatures will themselves be precedentialists, using the common law of 
past legislation to inform new decisions.  The overall regime would be one of Thayerism 
for courts, common-law constitutionalism for legislatures.   
This leaves a role for Burkean arguments that support legislative and executive 
judgments – Burkeanism as a shield.  But this is not a very impressive role.  Where 
constitutional texts are ambiguous, and precedent points in the same direction as enacted 
legislation or executive rules, judges will uphold what the legislature or executive has 
done.  Here there is no obvious problem, and no real need to defend common-law 
constitutionalism as a distinctive approach to constitutional adjudication.  Burkeanism as 
a sword is the theoretically crucial case for common-law constitutionalism, but it is also 
the very case where Condorcetian reasoning most strongly suggests that judges – either 
current judges or a notional judiciary aggregated over time – should defer to other 
institutions.   
The Frankfurter canon.  Justice Frankfurter suggested that the decisions of past 
legislatures and presidents about how to allocate powers among themselves places a sort 
of common-law gloss on ambiguous constitutional texts, especially in areas of separation 
of powers and foreign affairs, where the constitutional texture is especially open.
77  On 
the Condorcetian view, Frankfurter’s point is either important or banal, depending upon 
whether it is assumed that there is or is not a line of judicial precedent that construes the 
constitutional ambiguity in a way different than the other branches.   
If there is no such line of precedent, then on Condorcetian premises it is banal that 
current judges should rely on the implicit collective judgment of legislators and 
presidents over time.  Those judgments will be made by a statistical group far more 
numerous, and at least as expert, as the small group of current judges.  If there is a line of 
contrary precedent, however, Frankfurter’s idea is more cutting.  It suggests that the 
aggregated wisdom of many judges, over time, is still inferior to the aggregated wisdom 
of legislators and executive officials, over time.  In this latter case, Frankfurter’s view is a 
special case, in the area of separation of powers, of the claim that Burkean common-law 
constitutionalism should not be used as a sword -- at least not when Burkeanism is 
interpreted in informational terms. 
State legislatures and re-enactments.  Here is another special case of the same 
point.  Suppose that at time 1, Supreme Court justices issue a precedent decision 
invalidating state laws.  At time 2, many states re-enact those laws.  Should the Court 
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77 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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acquiesce at time 3, or enforce its contrary precedent?
78  On Condorcetian grounds, the 
answer is (almost certainly) that the Court should acquiesce.  Assume, however 
heroically, that state legislatures and the Court are addressing the same question at all 
times – whether a given state statutory rule complies with the federal constitution – and 
that there is a right answer to this question.  The aggregated current judgments of a 
massive number of state legislatures are superior, in terms of the Jury Theorem, to those 
of the group comprising the judges and justices who sat in the precedent case(s).  It is 
irrelevant that the legislators’ judgments are themselves sorted into groups (state 
legislatures) who make separate collective decisions under internal majority rule.  The 
Jury Theorem applies even to the purely notional and statistical group comprised of all 
the state legislators taken together, so long as the Theorem’s other conditions are met. 
In general, Condorcetian reasoning does not supply a convincing interpretation of 
common-law constitutionalism, particularly the latter’s explicitly Burkean claim that the 
limits of human reason support reliance on constitutional precedent and tradition.  The 
internal problem is simply that the Jury Theorem’s conditions will, quite often, not apply 
to any realistic description of the process of common-law constitutionalism.  The 
comparative institutional problem is that Condorcetian reasoning itself defangs common-
law constitutionalism in the most theoretically crucial cases – where precedent is used to 
trump clear constitutional text and history, or to trump the judgments of current 
legislatures and executive officials.  On Condorcetian grounds, the most plausible regime 
would be one of Thayerian, highly deferential courts, with common-law constitutionalism 
entrusted to legislatures.  The point that the views of many past judges embody more 
latent information than the views of a few judges sitting today may be correct, but that is 
not the relevant comparison in the testing cases. 
II.  Burke as Darwin 
  I will now turn from informational accounts of common-law constitutionalism to 
evolutionary ones.
79  The Condorcetian interpretation of Burke assumes the existence of 
exogenous right answers, somehow defined, in constitutional cases; posits that judges are 
sincerely attempting to find those answers; and posits that judges are more likely to find 
those answers by relying on common-law precedents than on their “private stock of 
reason.”  In the evolutionary interpretation, by contrast, no judge need be seeking to 
produce right answers.  Different judges have different motivations, ideologies and 
biases.  Nonetheless, the claim runs, some mechanism causes the uncoordinated action of 
biased judges to produce a body of common law that is economically efficient.  If such a 
                                                 
78 For an example of this issue, compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating most extant 
death penalty schemes) with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (validating death penalty after state re-
enactments)  
79  For the evolutionary interpretation of Burke, see, e.g., Strauss, supra note 5, at 879 (arguing for a “form 
of traditionalism, characteristic of the common law method, [that] calls for recognizing the value of 
conclusions that have been arrived at, over time, by an evolutionary process”); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 
368 (suggesting that some “Burkeans might stress not social practices but the slow evolution of judicial 
doctrine over time--and might therefore reject sharp breaks from the judiciary's own past. For these 
Burkeans, what is particularly important is the judiciary's prior judgments, which should in turn be based 
on a series of small steps, and should avoid radical departures”); Young, supra note 5, at 653-56 (offering 
an evolutionary interpretation of Burke and connecting “Burke’s theory of reform” to “the common-law 
tradition of evolutionary change”). 
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mechanism exists, it would be a species of invisible-hand explanation, in which 
efficiency would “arise from human action but not from human design.”
80
  What is the evolutionary mechanism exactly?  A selection mechanism requires 
variation in the relevant population (of organisms or cases); heritability, so that favored 
variations can be maintained in the population when they arise; and differential 
reproductive advantage (or “fitness”), meaning that favored variations are likely to 
replace competitors.
81  In evolutionary analyses of the common law, the first requirement 
is typically said or assumed to be satisfied by variation in the biases or preferences or 
judges or litigants, while the second is satisfied by the force of precedent.  However, the 
third requirement is the most problematic; here the analogy to Darwinian processes 
becomes particularly obscure.  What mechanism corresponds to natural selection of 
relatively fitter organisms?  
The most familiar attempt to answer this question involves the demand-side 
models of common-law evolution that have been prominent in law and economics.  By 
“demand-side” is meant that the common law’s claimed evolution towards efficiency is 
powered by the selection of cases for litigation --- by litigants’ decisions about what cases 
to appeal or settle.
82  I will examine both internal and institutional problems with the 
demand-side models.  First, as an internal matter, these models suffer from a kind of 
fragility; they are not robust against slight changes in the assumptions.  Second, in   
comparative institutional terms, there is no straightforward way to transpose these models 
to the setting of constitutional common law.  Even if constitutional common law tends to 
evolve towards efficiency, and even if it is desirable that constitutional be efficient, 
legislation may also tend towards efficiency, and for the same reasons.  Moreover, in a 
rapidly changing environment, legislation may at any given moment be more efficient 
than constitutional common law, even if the latter systematically tends towards efficiency 
while the former does not.  In parallel to the argument of Part I, the attempt to interpret 
Burke by way of Darwin leads most naturally to James Bradley Thayer’s idea that courts 
should systematically defer to legislatures in constitutional matters. 
A.  Demand-side Models: Internal Problems 
  I will not attempt a comprehensive overview of this massive literature.
83  Instead I 
will single out two relevant problems with the demand-side models: the fragility of their 
assumptions, and their silence about the rate at which common-law precedents converge 
to efficiency.  The former problem is better known, but the latter is even more serious, 
because it suggests that in rapidly changing environments the tendency of common law to 
converge to efficiency – even assuming it exists – will not matter very much; in 
particular, it will provide no comparative advantage over legislation.  
                                                 
80 Adam Ferguson; this is a paraphrase of Ferguson’s original. 
81 STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY (2002). 
82 For supply-side analysis, focusing on competition among institutions providing legal rules, see Todd J. 
Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551 
(2003). 
83 For a recent summary, see Paul H. Rubin, Why Was the Common Law Efficient?, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=498645. 
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  1.  Fragility 
  The basic engine of the demand-side models is selection pressure by litigants: if 
inefficient precedents are challenged more frequently, while efficient precedents are more 
often left in place, the law will tend to efficiency over time.  The basic aspiration of the 
literature is to propose mechanisms that will show why, and under what conditions, 
litigants will tend to differentially litigate inefficient precedents.  In the model that 
inspired much of the work in this area, the basic idea is that inefficient precedents inflict 
deadweight losses; the losers will thus have an incentive to pay more to attack the 
precedents than their beneficiaries will pay to defend them.
84  Many second-decimal 
refinements have been proposed, but the underlying ideas are similar, so I will call this 
the “basic model” and take it as the subject of discussion.  
  The basic model has been subjected to several major lines of critique, within a 
broadly rational-choice framework.
85  First, the basic model assumes that precedents can 
only be reaffirmed or overruled.  If they can also be further entrenched, however, then 
differential litigation might actually tighten the grip of inefficient precedents on the 
law.
86  Second, the basic model assumes that all classes of litigants have, on average, 
equal stakes and an equal interest in the future consequences of precedent.  But if 
different classes of litigants are differentially organized, perhaps because they have 
systematically different stakes or because some are repeat players while others are single-
shot litigants, then precedent can just as well evolve in inefficient directions.
87  There 
may be eventual convergence, but to rules favoring organized groups, not rules favoring 
efficiency.   
In general, rent-seeking litigation is as much a problem for models of common-
law efficiency as rent-seeking lobbying is for models of legislative efficiency,
88 a point I 
will return to shortly.  According to one historically-inflected version of this hypothesis, 
common law was efficient in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but is no longer so, 
because of the large-scale organization of rent-seeking litigation groups
89 or (in a supply-
side version) because of the decline in competition by different court systems.
90  The 
basic model can and has been refined to try to account for these critiques, but only by 
making more stringent the conditions under which precedent converges to efficiency.
91
                                                 
84 Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); see also George L. 
Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). 
85 For a critique drawing on behavioral economics, see Adam J. Hirsch,  Evolutionary Theories of Common 
Law Efficiency: Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425 (2005).  Cf. Gillian K. 
Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583 (1992).  I will bracket such issues in the 
discussion here. 
86 Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 
J.L. & ECON. 249, 272 (1976). 
87 The authors of the basic model recognized this point.  See Rubin, supra note 71. 
88 See Einer L. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE 
L.J. 31 (1991); Gordon Tullock, THE CASE AGAINST THE COMMON LAW (1997). 
89 Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1982); Tullock, supra note. 
90 See Zywicki, supra note. 
91 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Information, Litigation and Common Law Evolution, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
33 (2006). 
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  After some thirty years of discussion, the fairest assessment is that the thesis of 
common-law efficiency (at least as driven by demand-side effects) should best be taken 
as a possibility, no more.  Under imaginable conditions the common law will 
systematically tend to converge towards efficiency.  However, slight changes in the initial 
assumptions seem to produce large effects, driving the implications of the models hither 
and yon and leaving the basic thesis unresolved.  The natural response is to call for some 
facts; I will mention some relevant empirical work in Part III.  Here the point is just that 
the mechanisms in view are insufficiently robust to inspire any confidence. 
  2.  Environmental Change 
  Suppose the basic demand-side mechanism is not fragile, but robust, and ignore 
comparative institutional questions, which I shall take up shortly.  What implications 
does the basic model have?  Surprisingly few, for a simple reason that has not been much 
discussed in the literature.  Efficiency is always relative to the constraints established by 
the relevant environment.  In the economic sense, in which all economic factors are put to 
their highest-value use and all Pareto-improving trades are consummated, these 
constraints arise from available resources and technology (parametric constraints) and 
from competition by other economic actors (strategic constraints).  In the biological 
sense, the optimal adaptation of organisms is determined by natural resources and 
competition from other organisms. 
  The consequence is the following.  The claim that some population – of 
organisms or cases -- evolves towards efficiency is importantly different than a claim that 
the population reaches efficiency.  A crucial variable is the relative rate of change in the 
population, compared to the environment.  If the environment changes slowly, relative to 
the process of adaptation, organisms will be well-adapted given the constraints.  But if 
the environment changes quickly, relative to the speed of adaptation, then at any given 
moment most of the relevant population may be poorly adapted.  Thus an important 
general argument against institutional analogues of natural selection is that the rate of 
change in the political and social world is, in general, much faster than in the natural 
world.
92  Against the background of a natural environment that is relatively stable over 
periods of millions of years, it is plausible to proceed on the assumption that most extant 
organisms are well-adapted.  In institutional settings such as the market, however, the 
higher rate of environmental change means that many extant firms may be poorly-
adapted at any given time, even if there is strong pressure towards efficiency. 
  An analogous problem arises here.  Nothing at all in the demand-side models 
implies, in and of itself, anything about (1) the rate at which the common law converges 
to efficiency or (2) the rate of change in the background social, economic and policy 
environment against which efficiency must be judged.  If the speed of convergence is 
slow, relative to the rate of change in the background environment, then even a 
systematic tendency towards efficiency will not guarantee that most common-law rules 
are efficient.  Indeed, if the rate of environmental change is high, many or most common-
law rules might be inefficient at any given time, even if the pressure towards efficiency is 
powerful. 
                                                 
92 Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: A Theory of Imperfect Irrationality, 16 SOC. SCI. INFO. 469 (1977). 
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  I have indicated the conditions under which the common law might tend towards 
or reach efficiency; although it is hard to know in the abstract whether or not those 
conditions hold, there are no real grounds for confidence that they do.  A central point is 
that the standard demand-side models, even if robust, carry no implication at all that most 
common-law rules will be efficient, at any given time.  One must also compare the rate at 
which common law tends to efficiency with the rate of environmental change. 
  The implication is that the thesis of common-law efficiency is most plausible in 
and for periods in which the rate of economic, technological and political change is 
relatively slow, but is less plausible where change proceeds relatively rapidly.  Above, I 
mentioned the thesis that the common law was efficient in the 19
th century but has since 
ceased to be so, because of the rise of organized litigation groups or the decline of 
supply-side competition among legal systems.  The current conjecture is in the same 
family, although the mechanism involves the relative rates of change in the common law 
and the background environment.  Perhaps Burke’s dictum, interpreted in evolutionary 
terms, offered a plausible account of common-law efficiency in England in the 17
th and 
18
th centuries, because the common law had time to evolve close to efficiency in a 
relatively stable environment.  Even if so, there is no reason to think that the common law 
is efficient in other times and places, such as today.  
B.  Demand-side Models: Constitutional Implications?   
  In this section, I will examine the question whether the demand-side models of 
common-law efficiency, even if internally robust, have any payoff for constitutional law.  
In general, they do not.  First, it is familiar that efficiency is a dubious normative goal for 
constitutional law.  Second, the basic demand-side model uses essentially the same 
mechanism – the willingness of regulated parties to bid more to avoid deadweight losses 
– that powers the standard model of legislative efficiency.  The basic model thus offers 
no convincing reason to assume that judicial precedents will converge to efficiency while 
legislation does not.  Third, even if legislation has no systematic tendency to converge to 
efficiency, legislation can respond more quickly to a changing environment.  Perhaps the 
common law is always tending towards efficiency, yet it may nonetheless at any given 
moment be farther away from the optimum than is the body of legislation at the same 
moment. 
1.  Should Constitutional Law be Efficient? 
  Efficiency is a deeply controversial general goal for constitutional law.  I will 
only touch upon the relevant issues here, both because the point is familiar,
93 and because 
it yields only an external critique of the premises of the evolutionary interpretation of 
Burke, rather than an internal critique of the interpretation’s logic.   
One well-known set of problems involves the moral status of efficiency.  If 
efficiency is equated with wealth maximization, there is the major problem that wealth, in 
itself, is not a value.
94  If efficiency is equated with either Pareto optimality or 
satisfaction of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, under which winners gain more than losers 
                                                 
93 The best discussion is Elhauge, supra note 75. 
94 See Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980) 
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lose, distributive concerns come to the fore.
95  These questions about the moral status of 
efficiency do not apply, at least in the same way, to efficient common law in the 
subconstitutional sense.  Where the subconstitutional common law is efficient, but there 
are no constitutional constraints, any desired redistribution can take place through the tax 
and transfer system; doing so will itself be the efficient means of redistribution.
96  If 
constitutional common law is used to block redistributive transfers that are inefficient but 
(arguably) required by justice, however, then the dubious moral status of efficiency is 
consequential.       
  One might sidestep or dilute these problems by distinguishing between or among 
different constitutional provisions.  Perhaps efficiency should be the goal of 
constitutional law under the Takings Clause, but not under the Due Process Clauses.  Yet 
nothing in the evolutionary model of the common law is tied to these textual and 
doctrinal differences; the relevant mechanisms are not sufficiently fine-grained to 
accommodate them.  Those differences could only be taken into account under an 
intentional model, in which judges purposefully promote efficiency, either because they 
have an intrinsic taste for it, or because public pressures force them to do so.
97  An 
intentional model of this sort, however, would no longer be Burkean in any obvious 
sense; it belongs to the realm of deliberate social engineering, by judges, that Burkeans 
deride as “innovation.”   
2.  Legislative Efficiency?  Thayer as Darwin 
  Suppose, however, that the goal of constitutional law is in general to promote 
efficient law.  Suppose also that a line of constitutional common-law decisions have 
established a certain rule, and that a course of legislation produces a statute conflicting 
with the constitutional common-law rule.  It does not follow that the judges would best 
promote efficiency by invalidating the statute on constitutional grounds.  The very 
premises suggesting that the common law tends towards efficiency also suggest that 
legislation tends towards efficiency. 
  Recall that the mechanism driving the basic model of common-law efficiency is 
that inefficient precedents inflict deadweight losses, and that the parties who suffer those 
losses will have greater incentives to attempt to overturn them than their beneficiaries 
will have to defend them (assuming equal stakes).  Over time, inefficient precedents will 
be challenged more often and more frequently overturned.  This model is, however, 
essentially the same as a standard model suggesting that legislation will be efficient, and 
for the same reasons.
98  In this model, “pressure groups” who suffer deadweight losses 
from inefficient legislation will spend more to overturn such laws than their beneficiaries 
will spend to defend them.  Despite the status quo bias of the legislative process, which 
                                                 
95 There is a massive literature on these problems; for a clear presentation, see LEWIS A. KORNHAUSER, 
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (May 31, 2006) (unpublished manuscript).  
96 LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN M. SHAVELL. FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). 
97 See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1
st ed. 1972) at 99 (“In searching for a reasonably 
objective and impartial standard, as the traditions of the bench require him to do, the judge can hardly fail 
to consider whether the loss was the product of wasteful, uneconomical resource use.”).  For a critique of 
the intentional version of the common-law-efficiency thesis, especially as applied to public law, see Frank 
Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes, and the Theory of Efficient Adjudication, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 431 (1980). 
98 Becker (1983). 
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favors groups defending inefficient legislation, the systematic tendency over time will be 
towards an efficient corpus of legislation.  The parallel between this model and the basic 
model of common-law efficiency was clear to all, right from the beginning.
99
  Both the basic model of common-law efficiency and the standard model of 
legislative efficiency assume equal distribution of stakes across groups.  Accordingly, the 
standard model of legislative efficiency has often been questioned by public-choice 
theorists who posit that differential organization by groups with unequally distributed 
stakes in legislative outcomes; such groups will seek and obtain inefficient legislation, 
and those who suffer the deadweight losses of such legislation will be insufficiently 
organized to resist.
100  But what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.  The same 
groups will also enjoy their organizational advantages in the adjudicative process,
101 
including the process of common-law constitutionalism. 
  Common-law constitutionalists have attempted to draw nonarbitrary distinctions 
between legislative and adjudicative processes, in ways that favor the latter.  To date 
none are convincing.  Consider the argument that the minimum bid – the minimum a 
group must pay to become a player in the lawmaking game – is lower in the courts than 
in the legislative process, while the marginal benefits of incremental expenditures tend to 
be higher in legislatures than in courts; both points are intended to show that well-funded 
groups have a greater advantage in legislatures.
102  Among other problems with this 
argument,
103 however, the point about marginal benefits of expenditures undermines the 
basic mechanism that is supposed to drive the common law to efficiency.  If litigation 
expenditures quickly reach a point of zero marginal benefit, then it will not matter that 
parties suffering deadweight losses would be willing to pay more to challenge inefficient 
precedents then the beneficiaries would be willing to pay to defend them, because the 
extra expenditures will have no positive effect on the likelihood of overturning the 
inefficient precedents. 
3.  Efficiency and Social Change 
  Putting aside the foregoing points, let us suppose now that efficiency is a 
plausible general goal for constitutional law, that judicial decisions systematically tend 
towards efficiency, and that legislative decisions do not.  It still does not follow that 
judges will best promote efficiency by invalidating statutes that conflict with a contrary 
line of precedent.   
The further problem is that if the background environment is changing rapidly, 
the legislation in force at any given time may well be more efficient than contrary 
precedent.  Although the latter systematically tends towards efficiency at all times, it 
                                                 
99 See Rubin, supra note 71. 
100 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 
(1965) and subsequent massive literature. 
101 See Elhauge, supra note; see also Kornhauser, supra note; Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public 
Choice, 50 Hastings L.J. 355 (1999). 
102 See Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review After All?, 
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Common Law (unpublished draft) at 46, available at 
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103 For further discussion, see Cross, supra note. 
  34  
  Limits of Reason 
never attains it at any point, because the environment creates a moving target.  New 
legislation has no dynamic tendency towards increasing efficiency over time (we are 
supposing), but may simply start at a higher level of efficiency than the common law 
rules in place at a given moment, which were developed in a previous environment and 
now suffer from obsolescence.  This is a short-run advantage of legislation that dissipates 
as the common law evolves towards efficiency in the new environment; but if further 
environmental change ensues, the common law may never catch up.  Where 
environmental change is rapid, a series of short runs is all there is.  This is an 
evolutionary parallel to the Benthamite argument, discussed in Part I, that legislatures 
systematically tend to have more current information, and thus better information overall, 
even if judicial decisions more effectively aggregate the information past judges 
possessed. 
The superior efficiency of legislation in a rapidly changing environment is merely 
a possibility.  Everything depends on the relative rates of change in three variables, the 
common law, the body of legislation, and the background political and economic 
environment.  But the possibility blocks any direct inference from the joint premises that 
(1) the common law tends towards efficiency and (2) legislation does not, to the 
conclusion that (3) judges who aim to promote efficiency should use constitutional 
common law to override statutes. 
I conclude that the evolutionary interpretation of Burke, like the informational 
interpretation, has few useful implications for constitutional law.  If this is so, then two 
conclusions are possible.  The minimum conclusion is that the recent and sophisticated 
arguments for Burkean constitutionalism based on the limits of reason are a dead end.  If 
no other arguments for Burkean constitutionalism are forthcoming, then a stronger 
conclusion follows: Burke’s dictum is an insight that cannot usefully be cashed out in 
constitutional law.  From the point that judges do better to draw upon the “bank and 
capital of ages” rather than their “private stock of reason,” not much follows. 
Conclusion 
  Much of this essay has been critical, aiming to express skepticism about recent 
arguments for common-law constitutionalism that draw upon sophisticated social-
scientific models of precedent.  However, I also hope the critique has constructive 
byproducts, at both the methodological and the substantive level.  Methodologically, I 
have offered a positive interpretation of the project of common-law constitutionalism, as 
an attempt to provide social-scientific underpinnings for Burke’s loose reflections on the 
limits of human reason, while also translating Burkean views to the constitutional setting.  
So too I have attempted to update Bentham’s critique of the constitutional common law, 
adapting it to the distinctive setting of the constitutional common law.  Even if the 
critique of common-law constitutionalism offered here fails, it is affirmatively useful to 
translate the common law’s historic competitor into the constitutional setting.   
Substantively, I have suggested that the informational and evolutionary 
mechanisms canvassed above lead most naturally, not to Burke, but to James Bradley 
Thayer – to extensive judicial deference to legislative enactments.  To the extent that 
informational and evolutionary mechanisms yield insights about the conditions under 
which courts should trump legislation on the basis of constitutional precedent, those 
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conditions are predictably very narrow.  The first virtue of any theory of constitutional 
adjudication is a theory of judicial review – of judicial power to override legislative 
commands.  But the very mechanisms that common-law constitutionalists invoke in 
praise of constitutional precedent cast legislation in a better light still.  If many judicial 
minds are better than one or a few, many legislative minds are plausibly best of all.        
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